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McDowell: Battered Spouse Syndrome: Testing the Traditional Limits of South
BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME: 1

TESTING THE TRADITIONAL
LIMITS OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the first studies on battered spouse syndrome (BSS or the syndrome)
were conducted two decades ago, 2 commentary surrounding BSS has become
prevalent in both the popular press and America's court systems. Within the
legal context, evidentiary and causal issues have slowly taken shape. South
Carolina first recognized that expert testimony on BSS is relevant to a claim
of self-defense in 1986, when the supreme court decided State v. Hill.3 The
court, in dicta, later expanded its views on the compatibility of BSS and selfdefense claims, in Robinson v. State.4 South Carolina's most recent word on
the subject came from the legislature when it enacted section 17-23-170.' This
statute essentially codifies Hill and Robinson's dicta6 and adds to the substance
of prior case law by allowing expert testimony on BSS to support a defense of
duress, necessity, and defense of another. The statute also allows lay testimony
concerning a batterer's prior acts as foundation evidence prior to expert
testimony.' The South Carolina Supreme Court has yet to address each of
these defenses as they relate to BSS. This article begins with a discussion of
BSS and continues with a discussion of South Carolina's possible treatment of
section 17-23-170.
Dr. Lenore Walker' estimates that as many as half the women currently

1. For the purposes of this article, "battered spouse syndrome" is used interchangeably with
"battered wife's syndrome" and "battered woman's syndrome." See infra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text.
2. Dr. Lenore Walker, anoted expert onBSS and originator ofthe phrase "battered woman,"
claims that the first epidemiological study on battered women was conducted in 1976. LENOKE
E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN 20 (1979).

3. 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986).
4. 308 S.C. 74, 417 S.E.2d 88 (1992).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). Written notice must be filed
with the court prior to trial if BSS evidence is intended to be offered. Id. § 17-23-170(E).
6. See Robinson, 308 S.C. at 78-80, 417 S.E.2d at 91-92; Hill, 287 S.C. at 399-400 S.E.2d
at 122.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
8. Dr. Walker is often quoted by courts, including the Robinson court, and is widely noted
as a leading expert in the field. Dr. Walker, however, does have her critics. See David L.
Faigman, Note, The BatteredWoman Syndrome andSelf-Defense:ALegalandEmpiricalDissent,
72 VA. L. REv. 619, 632-43 (1986) (stating that Walker's view of the cyclical nature of BSS
possesses significant "methodological and interpretative flaws" and that her learned helplessness
theory is inadequate because it does not account for the behavior of women who remain in
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in prison committed their crimes to avoid further beatings from their spouses. 9
The acts that the women committed include "[florging checks to pay his bills,
stealing food or other items that he denied the children, selling drugs to keep
his supply filled, [and] hurting someone else so he didn't hurt her."" Dr.
Walker further contends that "[flew of these women received an appropriate
defense for their acts."" In recognition of the plight of battered women, the
sometimes drastic measures to which they resort, and the incompatibility of
BSS evidence
with traditional defenses, courts and legislatures have relaxed the
2
'
rules.
UI. BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME FUNDAMENTALS
All women that are beaten are not classified as battered women. Dr.
Walker defines a battered woman as:
[A] woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something
he wants her to do without any concern for her rights .... Mo be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering
cycle at least twice. 3
Dr. Walker's, "battering cycle" consists of three phases "which vary in both
time and intensity for the same couple and between different couples. " " The
first phase is termed the "tension building phase;" it consists of minor
instances of abuse that create tension between the parties.' 5 During this phase
the woman "lets the batterer know that she accepts his abusiveness as
legitimately directed toward her" and in effect employs the psychological
defense of denial. 6 The violence escalates in the second phase, which is
appropriately labeled the "acute battering incident."' 7 A brief expression of
rage and the batterer's releasing his built up tension characterize this phase. 8
battering relationships); Robert F. Schopp et al., BatteredWoman Syndrome, ExpertTestimony,
and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1 U. ILL. L. Rv. 45, 53-64 (1994)
(concluding that Walker's data does not support a claim that battering relationships produce a
regular pattern identifiable as BSS).
9. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 142 (1984).

10. Id.
11. Id.

12. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Robinson v. State,
308 S.C. 74, 417 S.E.2d 88 (1992).
13. WALKER, supra note 2, at xv.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.at 55.
Id.at 56.
Id.
Id. at 59.

18. Id. at 60. This phase usually lasts "from two to twenty-four hours, although some women
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/8
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The battered spouse does not generally seek help after this phase unless the
injuries are so severe that medical attention is necessary. 19 The third phase,
termed "kindness and contrite loving behavior," brings a pause in the violence
as the batterer seeks forgiveness for his actions. 0 During the third phase the
batterer tries to convince the victim of his sincerity and that the beatings will
not happen again.21 After a while the cycle begins anew.
The cyclical nature of BSS and the general refusal of the battered spouse
to seek help has caused some courts and analysts to state that the battered
victim suffers from "'learned helplessness' as the 'repeated batterings, like
electrical shocks, diminish the woman's motivation to respond.'" ' This
learned helplessness "stems from the battered woman's belief that her batterer
is more powerful than he actually isl and her fear of retaliation if she
summons help."' Comprehension of learned helplessness is one reason
courts have altered the traditional standards that govern defenses employed by
battered women.2'
In particular, BSS has had an impact on a battered woman's claim of selfdefense. Early in the syndrome's legal existence, opposing sides debated the
admissibility of expert testimony on BSS to support claims of self-defense in
situations where traditional notions of self-defense would preclude such
evidence. For the most part, supporters of the admissibility of such testimony
won the debate.' Most states, through court decision, now admit expert
testimony on BSS.2 South Carolina is, in fact, one of six states that have
passed a statute specifically allowing the admission of expert testimony on BSS
in a self-defense claim.27 Thus, the debate over evidentiary issues surrounding
BSS has shifted. The focus is now on the limitations, if any, that should be
imposed on the admissibility of such evidence.

have reported a steady reign of terror for a week or more." Id.
19. Id. at 63.
20. Id. at 65.
21. Id. at 65-66.
22. Robinson v. State, 308 S.C. 74, 77, 417 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1992) (quoting WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 7 (1984)).
23. Id. at 77, 417 S.E.2d at 90 (citing People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (1992)).
24. Id. at 77, 417 S.E.2d 88.
25. See Schopp et al., supra note 8, at 59 (stating that "courts and commentators have
accepted [BSS] testimony as well established").
26. For a list of several of the decisions involving the admissibility of expert testimony on

BSS, see Amy M. Taheri, Note, Criminal Law-Wyoming's Battered Woman Syndrome
Statute-How FarCan an Expertgo to Support a Battered Woman's Self-Defense Claim? Witt
v. State, 892 P.2d 132 (Wyo. 1995), 31 LAND & WATER L. REv. 249, 253, n.33 (1996).
27. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1107 (Deering 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 10-916 (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.033 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.392
(Anderson 1994); S.C. DOE ANN. § 17-23-170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-203 (Michie Supp. 1995).
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III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S APPROACH

The South Carolina Supreme Court has addressed the admissibility of BSS
evidence directly in only two cases. The question first came before the court
in 1986 in State v. Hill,28 in which the court held that evidence which
established a defendant's suffering from BSS was relevant to a claim of selfdefense. The Hill court stopped short of recognizing BSS as a separate
defense.29 In Robinson v. State the court, attempting to "provide some
guidance to members of the bench and bar," discussed, in dicta, the "relationship between the battered woman's syndrome and the law of self-defense as
it is defined in South Carolina." 3" Due to the apparent incompatibilities of
BSS and the legal concept of self-defense, the court, in its guidance,
demonstrated how the traditional elements of self-defense could be relaxed and
how expert testimony on BSS could be used to satisfy defendant's burden.3"
The legislature continued the courts' work by passing section 17-23-170,
which became effective without the Governor's signature on January 12, 1995.
This section essentially codifies Hill and the dicta in Robinson. The statute
provides: "Evidence that the actor was suffering from the battered spouse
syndrome is admissible in a criminal action on the issue of whether the actor
lawfully acted in self-defense, defense of another, defense of necessity, or
defense of duress." 32
At first blush this statute appears to represent the legislature's willingness
to treat BSS as a special category of persons with special evidentiary
privileges. Indeed, the legislature phrased the statute in terms of the "battered
spouse syndrome."3" Reasonably, one could conclude that the statute covers
only married individuals. However, close inspection of BSS in other legal
literature and analyses indicates a broader definition.34 For example, the
Missouri Court of Appeals has interpreted language identical to South
Carolina's statute 35 to include unmarried lovers.36 Because the Missouri case
was decided before the South Carolina General Assembly enacted section 1723-170, one might assume that the General Assembly was aware of the
decision and impliedly adopted its reasoning. Finally, although most cases

28. 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986).
29. Id. at 400, 339 S.E.2d at 122.
30. 308 S.C. 74, 78-80, 417 S.E.2d 88, 91-92 (1992). For an analysis of this case, see Cam
Yates, Case Note, 45 S.C. L. REv. 127 (1993).
31. See Robinson, 308 S.C. at 78-80, 417 S.E.2d at 91-92.
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
35. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) with Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 563.033 (1987).
36. State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
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involve a battered woman, the statute does not expressly limit the applicability
of the statute to women.37
IV. BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME EVIDENCE: SEARCHING FOR LIMITATIONS
OF SCOPE

A. Regarding Claims of Self-Defense
As previously mentioned, South Carolina's statute appears to be a straight

codification of decisional law.38 Importantly, the.Robinson decision, which is
presumably the primary source and impetus for section 17-23-170, admits to
being a "cursory" 39 stab at the subject. Together, the statute and the
Robinson decision left unanswered the question of appropriate limitation on the
admissibility of BSS testimony in self-defense cases. More precisely, what
behavior did the General Assembly envision as "lawfully acted in self-

defense? " 40
In Robinson, the court stated that a battered woman may be characterized
as "the victim of a continuing assault" and that "the first element of selfdefense may be satisfied even though the battered woman acts at a time when
the batterer is not physically abusing her." 41 The court relaxed the imminent
danger requirement by stating that "battered women can experience a
heightened sense of imminent danger arising from the perpetual terror of
physical and mental abuse" that often "does not wane, even when the batterer
is absent or asleep. "42 The third element (approval of the self-defender's
actions from a third-party perspective) was altered from the viewpoint of a

37. The statute is phrased in the gender neutral term actor. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170
(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
38. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
39. Robinson v. State, 308 S.C. 74, 80, 417 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1992).
40. See id.
41. Robinson, 308 S.C. at 79, 417 S.E.2d at 91. The supreme court actually announced the
four elements of self-defense in State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452:
First, the defendant must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty. Second, the
defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life
or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger.
Third, if his defense is based upon his belief of imminent danger, a reasonably
prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same
belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the circumstances were such
as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness and courage to strike the fatal
blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or losing his own life.
Fourth, the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing
his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular
instance. If, however, the defendant was on his own premises he had no duty to
retreat before acting in self-defense.
42. Robinson, 308 S.C. at 79, 412 S.E.2d at 91.
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reasonably prudent person of ordinary firmness to one that accounts for the
circumstances of a battered woman facing interminable torture and impossible
escape. 43 The court also relaxed the fourth element of self-defense by
recognizing that "a battered woman who is held hostage by her batterer may
have no other means of avoiding a battering than to kill [him] in selfdefense."'
In the end, the Robinson decision overlooks the possibility that a battered
woman is not suffering from BSS or has available to her avenues of help short
of homicide. 45 The ruling inserts without exception the psychological
processes of a battered woman who feels she cannot escape. The court's
approach in Robinson sets up a relaxed standard that has few if any limitations
on the admission of BSS evidence in a self-defense claim.
Perhaps there should be some limitation based on the manner and setting
of the alleged self-defense-a requirement that the defendant demonstrate some
indicia of momentary passion. After all, not every battered woman kills her
husband during a battering episode. Indeed, such cases have even included
murder-for-hire style executions of the batterer. The following three scenarios
further illustrate the different means by which battered spouses kill their
batterers. First, after a day of intense beating, the batterer pins down his wife
and begins choking her. Several times, he threatens to kill her. She manages
to get to a gun and shoot her husband. In a case resembling these facts the
wife was found not guilty.46 Second, a woman, after years of abuse, retaliates
and shoots her husband while he sleeps.47 Third, as alluded to above, driven
to submission and fear a woman after years of abuse, unwilling or unable to
face her batterer, hires a third party to kill her husband for her. Each of the
women upon whose actions the above scenarios are based claimed self-defense
to justify her actions.4"
Courts typically admit BSS testimony when the murder occurs during a
battering episode because this generally falls within the classic definition of

43. Id. This change in standards, coupled with the ruling in State v. Hendrix, 270 S.C. 653,
244 S.E.2d 503 (1978) (providing that defendant was entitled to jury instructions that took into
consideration the defendant's size, sex, and age) can be used to obtain jury instructions fashioned
in terms of the "reasonable battered woman." See id. WILLIAM S. MCAiNCH & W. GAsTON
FAIREY, THE CRMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 488 (3d ed. 1996).
44. Robinson, 308 S.C. at 79-80, 417 S.E.2d at 92.
45. Possible avenues of help that the battered spouse could take include seeking out police,
family, or friends or simply leaving the batterer. Of course, the essence of the learned
helplessness theory is an effective diminution of the battered
spouse's ability to end the abusive relationship through traditional avenues.
46. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Fogle, 309 S.C. 64, 67, 419 S.E.2d 825, 827 (Ct. App.
1992).
47. See Robinson, 308 S.C. 74, 417 S.E.2d 88; State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
48. See Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 1995); Haney v. Alabama, 603 So. 2d 412
(Ala. 1992); People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
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self-defense. Indeed, under the present state of South Carolina law there is
little, if any, doubt that such evidence is admissible.4 9
All courts are not in agreement on the admissibility of evidence when a
battered spouse kills her sleeping batterer 5 0 In such cases, the imminence
requirement is strained at best, as a sleeping person poses no objective
immediate threat. In State v. Norman, the North Carolina Supreme Court in
just such a case "decline[d] to expand [North Carolina] law of self-defense
beyond the limits of immediacy and necessity which have heretofore provided
an appropriately narrow but firm basis upon which homicide may be
justified.""' In Robinson, which also involved a woman who killed her
husband while he slept, the South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with the
North Carolina court, citing Judge Martin's dissenting opinion several times
with approval.52 The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that a battered
spouse can satisfy the imminence requirement "even though her batterer is not
physically abusing her when she acts."" South Carolina's BSS statute,
coming on the heals of the Robinson decision, strengthens this interpretation
of what it means to have "lawfully acted in self-defense.""
Courts are least reluctant to exclude expert testimony on BSS in murderfor-hire cases. 55 Of all the situations in which a battered spouse could kill her
batterer, hiring a third party to do the deed is furthest removed from the
imminence requirement of traditional self-defense. Unfortunately, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has not addressed the admissibility of expert
testimony on BSS in a murder-for-hire case. There are, however, two Missouri
cases, where the evidentiary statute is identical to South Carolina's,5 6 that are
somewhat illuminating." The two opinions are split on the admissibility of

49. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); Robinson, 308 S.C. 74,
417 S.E.2d 88; State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986).
50. The admissibility of expert testimony on BSS to support a claim of self-defense when
battered spouses kill their batterers has been recognized in the following cases: People v. Beasley,
622 N.E.2d 1236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Chapman v. State, 386 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1989). The
following courts reached the opposite conclusion: State v. Grant, 470 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1996);
California v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); State
v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).
51. 378 S.E.2d at 16. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently refused to overrule
Norman under a similar set of facts. Grant, 470 S.E.2d 1.
52. Robinson v. State, 308 S.C. 74, 76, 417 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1992).
53. Id. at 79, 417 S.E.2d at 91. The court justified this assertion because a battered woman
'can experience a heightened sense of imminent danger arising from the perpetual terror of
physical and mental abuse" that often "does not wane, even when the batterer is absent or
asleep." Id.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
55. See infra note 57.
56. See supra note 35.
57. See Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 1994); Martin v. State, 712 S.W.2d 14
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BSS evidence, yet in both cases, the defendants were convicted and received
long sentences. 8 Most of what can be said regarding the BSS evidentiary
issue in these cases is that there was large deference given to the trial judges,
one of whom made a rather effective conditional ruling as to admissibility. 9
Conditional rulings seem to be a logical solution to extreme claims (like the
murder-for-hire scenarios) that test the outer limits of self-defense. For one
thing, denying admission of BSS evidence until a prima facie self-defense
claim is made out prevents an undeserving defendant from exploiting juror
passions. Perhaps contemplating such a dilemma, the Robinson court
acknowledged that the imminence requirement would ultimately depend on the
facts of each case.' ° In the end, it seems likely that South Carolina courts
would also give great deference to trial judge discretion in the murder-for-hire
context.
B. In Defense of Another
Closely related to self-defense is the defense of another. Both defenses are
used to justify the assault or killing of an aggressor. South Carolina has
adopted the alter ego rule as the definitive test for defense of another. 6' Under
this rule the intervener has the same privilege to act as the person for whom
he intervenes. 62 Therefore, if the person the intervener acted for had the right
of self-defense then the intervener is similarly protected. The intervener's
reasonable belief that the person he was acting for was in danger is irrelevant.
This position protects against the use of inappropriate force prompted by
misleading appearances. 63 For instance, someone screaming and resisting
arrest by undercover police officers does not have the right of self-defense
under normal circumstances. However, an observer could form a reasonable
belief that the person was in danger and choose to intervene. By linking the
rights of the victim to the rights of the intervener the law provides protection
to innocent individuals such as the undercover police officers in the previous
example. Consider the following scenario in which the defense of another is
likely to arise in connection with BSS: A woman killed her husband after he
grabbed their son and made threats that he would kill the child. Although her

(Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
58. Anderson, 44 F.3d at 677 life imprisonment without possibility of parole); Martin, 712
S.W.2d at 15 (life imprisonment without parole for fifty years).

59. See Anderson, 44 F.3d at 680-81.
60. Robinson v. State, 308 S.C. 74, 79, 417 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1992).
61. State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862 (1907) (per curiam).

62. Id.
63. State v. Woodham, 162 S.C. 492, 160 S.E. 885 (1931). But see N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 35.15 (McKinney 1987) (statute that reversed New York's common law alter ego rule and
inserted the rule of reason test).
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husband had fired a gun at her moments before, she did not shoot her husband
until after he grabbed and threatened their son. After years of suffering both
physical and mental abuse at the hands of her husband, the woman believed
that her husband was going to kill their son. In a case involving just these facts
a woman was charged with murder. She later pled guilty to manslaughter and
was released to be reunited with her son. 64
Under South Carolina's traditional alter ego rule it is questionable whether
the woman in the above scenario could successfully raise the defense of
another unless her son would have been justified to act in self-defense. South
Carolina Code section 17-23-170(A)' appears to carve out an exception to the
alter ego rule. A woman is allowed to introduce exculpatory evidence
pertaining to her own state of mind. The statute effectively shifts the focus
from the perceptions of the intended victim to the perceptions of the abused
intervener.
Having grasped the statutory entitlement to plead defense of another, the
BSS victim faces additional obstacles. First, the same requirement of retreat
that is applied to the intended victim is placed on the intervener.' In practice
this will most likely not be a problem because a person has no duty to retreat
if originally in her own home.67 In the above scenario this limitation would
not pose a problem as the events occurred at the home of the child.6" The
second limitation requires the intervener to cease hostilities when the adversary
withdraws. 69 This limitation is more likely to cause problems in BSS cases. In
the above scenario, it is not difficult to imagine that the father threatened the
child and may have briefly punished the child. As soon as any hostilities
ceased, or the father withdrew, the privilege of defense of another would cease
as well. The BSS statute may, however, lessen the impact of the duty to cease
hostilities. Indeed, the statute is words without substance unless the legislature
intended to make an exception to both the alter ego rule and the rule of
70
withdrawal.

64. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 131-36, 187 (1987).
65. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
66. State v. Sales, 285 S.C. 113, 328 S.E.2d 619 (1985).

67. State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984) (per curiam).
68. BROWNE, supra note 64, at 131-36, 187.

69. State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862 (1907).
70. Recall that the South Carolina Supreme Court dealt with self-defense and BSS in Robinson
v. State, 308 S.C. 74, 417 S.E.2d 88 (1992). Because self-defense and the defense of another are
similar, the logic employed in Robinsonshould apply to defense of another creating an expansive
interpretation of this defense as well.
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C. In Instances of Duress and Necessity
The relationship between BSS and the defenses of duress and necessity
also wants for exploration. The defenses of duress7' and necessity are very
similar in South Carolina.' Both defenses are based on the proposition that
the only way to prevent a greater harm is to act in a manner that will result
in a lesser harm. The two defenses differ, however, regarding the focus on the
actor. Duress focuses on the actor's reaction to external threats or coercion,
but the defense of necessity focuses on the actor's reaction to a set of
circumstances put in motion either by a third party or by nature.73 As a result
of this distinction, duress is the more likely ally of the battered spouse.
Because the underlying justification for duress is to prevent a greater harm
by causing a lesser harm, duress is not a defense to murder and cannot be used
to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter.7' Although such a rule would
seem to preclude the use of BSS evidence in capital murder cases, there are
several situations in which BBS evidence would be appropriate.75 Consider the
following two scenarios in which the defense of duress is likely to arise and
bring to bear BSS evidence: (1) A woman contended she was brainwashed
through sexual and physical torture by her husband. The woman further
contended that she kidnapped and killed a thirteen year old girl at the direction
of her husband due to her brainwashing. She was convicted of capital murder
and kidnapping and sentenced to death; 76 (2) A woman was convicted of
welfare fraud even after presenting evidence that her husband had beaten and

71. For a further analysis of duress and BSS, see Meredith Blake, Coerced Into Crime: The
Application of Battered Woman Syndrome to the Defense of Duress, 9 VIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 67 (1994); Beth I.Z. Boland, Battered Women Who Act Under Duress, 28 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 603 (1994). Laurie Kratky Dor6, DownwardAdjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use
ofDuress in Defense ofBatteredOffenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 665 (1995); Susan D. Appel, Note,
Beyond Self-Defense: The Use of Battered Woman Syndrome in Duress Defenses, 4 U. ILL. L.
REv. 955 (1994).
72. In State v. Worley, 265 S.C. 551, 220 S.E.2d 242 (1975), the court treated both defenses
the same.
73. See WILLIAM S. MCANINCH & W. GASTON FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 537-38 (3d ed. 1996).
74. State v. Rocheville, 310 S.C. 20, 425 S.E.2d 32 (1993). The availability of the duress
defense to one charged with murder as an accomplice was raised but not resolved in State v.
Robinson, 294 S.C. 120, 363 S.E.2d 104 (1987). Fora discussion of how other states handle the
ability to claim duress in a homicide prosecution, see Laurie Kratky Dor6,DownwardAdjustment
and the Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
665, 704-08, nn.154-60 and accompanying text (1995).
75. Duress has been held to be a defense to kidnapping and criminal sexual conduct. Frasier
v. State, 306 S.C. 158, 410 S.E.2d 572 (1991).
76. Neeley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 670-71, 677 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So. 2d
697 (Ala. 1986).
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threatened her after he learned of her desire to tell the welfare department that
he was employed.'
In the first scenario, expert testimony on BSS would not be admitted into
evidence (to contest the homicide charge) since duress is not a defense to
murder. The second scenario and the kidnapping charge presented in the first
scenario, however, are likely candidates for admission of expert testimony on
BSS.
The BSS statute expands the common law defense of duress. In a typical
case involving a battered spouse claiming duress, the proverbial "gun to the
head" is absent. Instead there is a constant threat of future beatings coupled
with the subdued will of the battered spouse. In light of the language in
Robinson,7 8 South Carolina courts will likely view duress broadly, giving a
wide defimition to the phrase "lawfully acted."79
The South Carolina Supreme Court has fashioned a three part test for the
defense of necessity." Because of the similarities between duress and
necessity, this test can be expected to affect future interpretations of duress in
contexts which involve BSS testimony. To establish a necessity defense a
defendant must show first, that there is an immediate emergency not of the
actor's own making; second, that the emergency is of such a nature to create
a reasonable belief of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done; and
third, that no reasonable alternative exists other than committing the crime."1
Analogizing this three part test to a duress defense, a South Carolina court
would likely use the Robinson' standard for immediacy to satisfy the first
element of duress. That is, the immediate emergency requirement could be
distilled from the "perpetual terror of physical and mental abuse" that a
battered spouse suffers.8 3
Likewise, the Robinson court's interpretations of what constitutes a
reasonable apprehension of death or harm and whether any alternative to crime
exists can be expected to affect a ruling as to duress. The court stated that
"[w]here torture appears interminable and escape impossible, the belief that
only the death of the batterer can provide relief may be reasonable."' If

77. West Virginia v. Lambert, 312 S.E.2d 31 (W.Va. 1984).
78. Robinson v. State, 308 S.C. 74, 417 S.E.2d 88 (1992).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
80. State v. Cole, 304 S.C. 47, 49-50, 403 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1991) (citing the duress case of
State v. Robinson, 294 S.C. 120, 121-22, 363 S.E.2d 104, 104 (1987)).
81. Id.
82. Robinson, 308 S.C. at 79, 417 S.E.2d at 91 (the imminence requirement of self-defence
may be satisfied by looking to the facts of each case to determine whether the battered spouse
experienced a "heightened sense of imminent danger arising from the perpetual terror of physical
and mental abuse.") Id.
83. Robinson, 308 S.C. at 79, 417 S.E.2d at 91.
84. Robinson, 308 S.C. 79, 417 S.E.2d 91.
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courts follow this dicta in Robinson and thereby lessen the standard of
reasonableness for duress to that which is reasonable for a battered woman,
BSS evidence will be readily admissible in a wide variety of cases.
V. CONCLUSION

The debate over admissibility of expert testimony regarding BSS is, for
the most part, over in South Carolina. The South Carolina General Assembly
laid this basic question to rest when it followed the South Carolina Supreme
Court's decisions of State v. Hill' and State v. Robinson 6 and enacted Code
section 17-23-170.1 All that remains is a determination of the limits, if any,
that will apply.
The General Assembly gave the courts wide berth to determine these
limits. As such, it is likely that the courts will continue on the path set forth
in Robinson and give an expansive interpretation to the term "lawfully acted"
found in section 17-23-170.88 Killing a sleeping batterer will no doubt be
treated as within the scope of the statutory language for this was the case in
Robinson itself. Murder-for-hire, on the other hand, will likely be found
beyond the scope of section 17-23-170. Further, the courts seem ready to
interpret section 17-23-170 as altering the common law alter-ego rule for
defense of another from an objective to a subjective standard. Such an
interpretation will extend the traditional scope of defense of another. Finally,
given the opportunity, South Carolina courts will likely expand the common
law defenses of duress and necessity to accommodate the constant threats
associated with BSS.
BSS is a terrible plight that affects a growing segment of society.
Unfortunately, the actions taken by BSS sufferers do not fit neatly into the
traditional notions of the available defenses to those actions. The South
Carolina Supreme Court and the South Carolina General Assembly have
modified these traditional limits in an effort to recognize the plight of BSS
sufferers. Only time will tell whether the modifications will restore balance.
Richard A. McDowell

85.
86.
87.
88.

287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986).
308 S.C. 74, 417 S.E.2d 88 (1992).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-170(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
Id.
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